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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHARON L. HEATON,
Applicant and Appellant,

Industrial Commission
Case No. B85000588
Administrative Law Judge:

vs.

Judge Richard G. Sumsion
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Court of Appeals No. 870336-CA
Defendant and Respondent,

Priority No. 6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. WHEN AN INJURED EMPLOYEE HAS NOT
BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE THE DATE OF INJURY, IS
UNEMPLOYABLE, AND CANNOT BE REHABILITATED,
THE COMMENCEMENT OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
PAYMENTS OUT OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND SHOULD"
PROPERLY BE FOR SUCH PERIOD OF TIME BEGINNING
WITH THE TIME THAT PAYMENTS MADE BY THE
EMPLOYER OR ITS INSURANCE CARRIER TERMINATE.
In its brief, respondent Second Injury Fund (the Fund) takes
the position that the sole issue before the Court is whether or
not the Commission's designation of July 25, 1985, as the
appropriate date for commencement of permanent total disability
benefits was "wholly unsupported by substantial evidence in the
record."

(Brief of Second

paragraph.)

Injury Fund, p. 20, first full

The Fund relies, in part, on Oman v. Industrial Com'n

of Utah, 735 P.2d

665

(Utah App. 1987), and the following

statement therein:
There is no statutory language requiring
benefits to commence at either the date of

injury or the last day
whichever occurs later.
735 P.2d at 666.

of employment f

In Oman, however, the Court was responding to

the plaintifffs contention that benefits should have commenced
from the day after his last day of work, rather than from the date
of medical confirmation of his total disability.

Id.

The Court

found substantial evidence existed for commencing benefits on the
date of the confirmation.

The plaintiff had continued to work

after his injury andf according to the Court, "it was not until
years later

that the injury developed to a point of total

disability."

Id.

Unlike the plaintiff in Oman, the appellant in this case did
not continue to work after his injury and he has been permanently
and totally disabled since the time of his injury.
found

Dr. Chapman

his ability to work inadequate to provide support on

February 16f 1978 (RI, p. 56.)
disabled for

Dr. Powell found him

"totally

any physical labor and probably . . . unable to

perform nonphysical sedentary work" as of June 20, 1978 (RI, pp.
65-70.)

Administrative Law Judge Sohm found him permanently and

totally disabled in May of 1979 (R.l, pp. 124-127.)

Dr. McNaught

stated he had been unable to work since 1976 on July 25, 1985 (R2,
p. 180, 181.)

Administrative Law Judge Sumsion, in a January 1986

letter, conceded

that it appeared

appellant was not only

permanently and totally disabled but had been from the time of his
industrial injury (R2, p. 77.)

And, the medical panel appointed

by Judge Sumsion, found that the appellant, though not rendered
unemployable on the basis of physical impairment, was unemployable
2

as

of

October

1, 1981

(R2, pp. 130, 131.)

Under

these

circumstances, appellant's benefits should properly commence from
the date payments of his permanent partial benefits from the
employer terminated.
Procedure for payment of permanent total disability is set
forth in § 35-1-67, Utah Code Ann., which states, in pertinent
part:
A finding by the commission of permanent total
disability shall in all cases be tentative and
not final until such time as the following
proceedings have been had: If the employee
has tentatively been found to be permanently
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory
that
the industrial
commission of
Utah
refer
the employee to the division
of
vocational rehabilitation
under the state
board
of education
for
rehabilitation
training .
.
.
. I f the division of
vocational rehabilitation under the state
board of education certifies to the industrial
commission of Utah in writing that the
employee has fully cooperated with the
division of vocational rehabilitation in its
efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the
opinion of the division the employee may not
be rehabilitated, the commission shall order
that there be paid to the employee weekly
benefits . . . for such period of time
beginning with the time that the payments, as
in this section provided, to be made by the
employer or its insurance carrier terminate
and ending with the death of the employee.
The Fund stipulated, and the Commission accepted the fact, that
the applicant may not be rehabilitated.

The applicant argued at

the time of the initial finding of permanent total disability that
he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits, but the
Commission deferred consideration of his argument until at least
March 1, 1981, allowed him to file for a further determination

after

that

time f and ordered t h a t he received permanent

partial

impairment b e n e f i t s from h i s employer u n t i l October 6, 1981.
applicant

cannot

immediately,

be

penalized

because

upon e x p i r a t i o n of h i s b e n e f i t s

he d i d

not

The
apply

from h i s employer,

for h i s permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s nor for the f a i l u r e of
Judge Sohm

or

§ 35-1-67.

the

Commission

to order

benefits

pursuant

to

As t h e record shows, Judge Sohm and the Commission

perceived some hope t h a t f u r t h e r medical procedures might improve
the a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n , and, p o s s i b l y for t h a t reason, did not
follow

the d i c t a t e s

of

§ 35-1-67 upon f i n d i n g

the

applicant

permanently t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d .
The only evidence the Fund c i t e s to support the Commission's
decision i s evidence of f u r t h e r
condition.

d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the

applicant's

This evidence merely shows, however, t h a t the hoped

for improvement of the a p p l i c a n t ' s condition did not occur.

The

only reasonable date for commencement of the b e n e f i t s in t h i s case
is

the

time

that

the
is

payments

the

only

to

date

be made by t h e

terminated.

It

supported

evidence.

In Oman, s u p r a , the Court s t a t e d :

by

employer

substantial

I t i s w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e
I n d u s t r i a l Commission t o d e t e r m i n e t h e
commencement d a t e of b e n e f i t s f o r t o t a l
p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y so l o n g as t h e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l
evidence and not p a t e n t l y unreasonable.
735 P.2d a t 667 (emphasis added.)

When doctors and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

law j u d g e s have r e g a r d e d t h e a p p l i c a n t

as permanently

d i s a b l e d since 1979, a determination t h a t b e n e f i t s for
total

disability

should not be p a i d
4

until

1985 i s

totally

permanent
patently

unreasonable.

The commencement date chosen by the commission is

arbitrary/ chosen in large part due to its coincidence * with the
applicant's renewed request for his benefits.
POINT II. THE WORKERS1 COMPENSATION LAWS ARE
TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED, AND ANY DOUBT
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION IS TO BE
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED EMPLOYEE.
The Fundfs argument that the Commission's decision must stand
unless it is "wholly unsupported by substantial evidence" does not
accurately
Commission

reflect the standard to be applied to review of
decisions

compensation law.
that

their

or the policy

behind

the workers 1

The appellate courts have repeatedly stated

review

of Commission

decisions

involves

the

determination whether the decision was "supported by substantial
evidence."

The difference between the statements regarding the

standard on review is not one of mere semantics.

Under the

standard as the Fund states itr a scintilla of evidence, a fact
here, a question of fact there, could suffice to support a
Commission decision.

But under the standard stated as the Court

states it, and applies it, a shred of evidentiary support will not
suffice; the decision must be supported by substantial evidence.
In Norton v. Industrial Com'n, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986), the
Supreme Court expressed the distinction in words reiterrating a
basic tenet of workers1 compensation law:
It need not be restated at great length that
the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be
liberally construed and that any doubt with
respect to the right of compensation will be
resolved in favor of the iniured employee.
728 P.2d at 1028.

CONCLUSION
The Second Injury Fund has not addressed the issue whether
deterioration of condition is or is not requisite to commencement
of benefits for an employee previously found to be permanently and
totally disabled, nor has it addressed the burden the "odd-lot"
doctrine places on one who contests commencement of payment, or
the fact it is not the province of a medical panel to determine
employability.

Instead, the Fund has argued the facts of the case

and sought to show that the Commission's decision was not "wholly
unsupported by substantial evidence" and was, therefore, supported
by substantial evidence*

The record shows, however, that the

decision of the Commission is not supported by substantial
evidence

and that the Commission, like the Fund, failed to

consider the issues appellant sets forth in his brief, which
issues were material to the decision presented to the Commission
by his case.

Appellant

respectfully requests the Court to

consider all of the issues raised on this appeal and to reverse
the Commission's decision and order commencement of his benefits
as of October 6, 1981.

The commencement date set forth by the

Commission was not determined by application of the law or
supported by substantial evidence.
DATED this

rtkf

day of January, 1988.

Wendy Mosiley
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ADDENDUM 1
Norton v. Industrial Com'n, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986)

NORTON v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N

Utah 1025

Cite as 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986)

than that encountered in non-employment
life and are therefore legally sufficient.
The medical causation test is likewise satisfied by the medical panel's finding that
"the work activities as described over a
three-day period could produce a lumbar
sprain aggravating the preexisting problem
he had had." No more is needed to hold
that Miera suffered a compensable industrial accident.
The case is remanded for a medical evaluation of Miera's industrial injury in proportion to his previous disability and a commensurate apportionment of benefit payments between the Second Injury Fund and
the State Insurance Fund. Costs are
awarded to Miera.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

J: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

Bruce D. NORTON, Plaintiff,
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH, United States Steel
Corporation, [Self-insured Employer],
and the Second Injury Fund of the
State of Utah, Defendants.
No. 21017.
Supreme Court of Utah.

ry, educational limitations, learning disability, and age, in concert with his multiple
disabling condition and need for total reeducation.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Workers' Compensation <3=>1639
Finding that worker was not permanently totally disabled was not supported
by sufficient evidence where Industrial
Commission failed to consider worker's vocational history, educational limitations,
learning disability, and age, in concert with
his multiple disabling conditions and need
for total reeducation.
2. Workers' Compensation <§=>847
Fact that worker continued work for
six years after accident, standing alone, did
not foreclose worker's claim that he was
permanently totally disabled where worker
spent those six years in considerable pain.
3. Workers' Compensation <3=5847
Relevant factors in determining whether worker who returned to work after accident is permanently totally disabled include
probable dependability with which injured
worker can sell his services in competitive
labor market, probability of future impairment of future earning capacity as indicated by nature of injury, age of worker,
and other relevant factors.
4. Workers' Compensation <3=>1377
Only where employee returns to work
after accident under normal conditions will
presumption of no loss of earning capacity
stay unassailed.

Nov. 25, 1986.
In petition for review, worker challenged decision of Industrial Commission
denying his claim for permanent total disability. The Supreme Court held that finding that worker was not permanently totally disabled was not supported by sufficient
evidence where Industrial Commission
failed to consider worker's vocational histo-

Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for Indus. Com'n.
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
Second Injury.
Phil N. Walker, San Francisco, Cal., for
U.S. Steel.
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PER CURIAM:
In this petition for review, petitioner
Bruce D. Norton challenges the decision of
the Industrial Commission denying his
claim for permanent total disability. Norton contends that the Commission erroneously based its findings on medical impairment alone without examining his earning
capacity, ignored his total disability under
the "odd-lot" doctrine, and ruled contrary
to the evidence produced by him in support
of his claim. None of the defendant parties has filed a response. We reverse and
remand for a hearing consistent with this
opinion.
Norton was employed as a coal miner of
United States Steel in East Carbon, Utah,
for thirty-nine years of his life. He was
sixteen years old when he began working
full-time in 1943 and fifty-six when he
stopped working in 1983. He earned a
living throughout those years by dint of his
brawn, performing arduous physical labor
that required little, if any, skills. Norton's
literacy is marginal at best.

informed his supervisor that inasmuch as
he had elected not to have surgery, he
should also take himself off compensation
and return to work.
Throughout his remaining working
years, Norton intermittently underwent
traction and physical therapy, wore a back
brace, and took pain medication. During
the last eighteen months of his work his
legs felt numb whenever he turned slightly, and at one point he experienced a fifteen to twenty minute paralysis of his left
lower extremity. His left-hand grip and
strength of the left arm continued to decrease to a point where he would drop
objects and frequently lose feelings in his
fingers at night. Nonetheless, he worked
until March of 1983 when he took a medical
retirement.

On August 10, 1977, Norton sustained an
injury to his neck and shoulder when a
pulley malfunctioned and sent a heavy cable crashing down on his neck with such
force that his face was embedded in the
coal and he had to be pried out from under
the cable by his companions. Initial diagnosis was contusion over base of neck, no
fracture. Norton returned to work after
one week wearing a soft collar. Because
of persistent pain, he was given a myelogram in December which showed a herniated disc at C5-C6 interspace and right
shoulder traumatic bursitis. Moderate irritation of the right C6-C7 nerve roots was
found as well. Traction and heat were
prescribed as conservative treatment, with
a possibility of surgery indicated. Norton
continued to suffer persistent headaches
and neck pain which have worsened with
time, apparently symptoms of residual
spondylosis and spurring. His company
physician advised him that the day would
come when he would want to have surgery.
Norton was reluctant to take that step and

Norton's prior injuries included a broken
back when he was thirteen years old, resisting in lumbar spine degenerative joint
disease, right ankle traumatic arthritis
stemming from a broken ankle, bilateral
inguinal hernia for which he has been in
surgery three times, hyperacidity with history of duodenal ulcer and focal skin cancers. Impairments developed after the industrial injury include tendovaginitis of the
right little finger, pulmonary allergic bronchitis, and hypertensive cardiovascular disease with cardiomyopathy aggravated by
life-long obesity.
Norton was pronounced ineligible for rehabilitation by the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation before the Commission rendered its final decision.
Basing his findings of facts and conclusions of law partially upon the report of a
medical panel, and partially upon the report
of Norton's own physicians, the administrative law judge found a 14% whole man
impairment attributable to pre-existing conditions, a 10% uncombined permanent physical impairment as a result of the industrial
accident, raising the overall impairment to
23% of the whole man, and a 31% impairment as a result of all causes that developed subsequent to the industrial accident.

1. Norton's challenge to the percentages found

by the medical panel and adopted by the admin-

NORTON v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N
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Cite as 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986)

The administrative law judge then concluded that this impairment construed in a light
most favorable to Norton did not require a
finding of permanent total disability. The
administrative law judge noted the impairments that followed the industrial accident,
stressed the fact that Norton continued to
work for six more years after the accident,
concluded that the evidence clearly did not
warrant a determination that Norton was
permanently and totally disabled as a consequence of his industrial accident and
therefore denied that claim. Nowhere in
the findings, conclusions and order, or in
the affirmance of that order by the Board
of Review is there any mention about Norton's eligibility for rehabilitation. No findings were made on Norton's earning capacity in his field of endeavor or elsewhere. It
is this lack of findings that mandates a
reversal and remand for further proceedings.
Under our well-settled standard of review, we are limited to determining whether the Commission's findings are supported
by substantial evidence. Hardman v. Salt
Lake City Fleet Management, Utah, 725
P.2d 1323 (1986) (citations omitted). But
where the findings of fact do not support
the award, this Court may set aside the
Commission's award. U.C.A., 1953, § 351-84(2).
[1] As in Hardman, supra, where it
confused the percentage of impairment, a
medical finding, with the percentage of disability, an administrative evaluation of
earning capacity, the Commission again
failed in this case to carry out its task. It
adopted with slight modification the findings of impairment reported by the medical panel but then failed in its administrative responsibility and function to evaluate
Norton's permanent disability
which
should have included such factors as Norton's "present and future ability to engage
in gainful activity as it is affected by such
istrative law judge must be rejected. The rating
is proper under the formula explained in Second Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill and Cabinet
Shop, 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984), and Jacobsen
Construction v. Hair, 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983).

diverse factors as age, sex, education, economic and social environment, in addition
to the definite medical factor—permanent
impairment." 2 As this Court has stated in
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681
P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1984):
This ability is evaluated not in the abstract, but in terms of the specific individual who has suffered a work related
injury
[I]n assessing the lack of
earning capacity, a constellation of
factors must be considered, only one of
which is the physical impairment. Other
factors are age, education, training and
mental capacities. [Citations omitted.]
It is the unique configuration of these
factors that together will determine the
impact of the impairment on the individual's earning capacity.
Accord Hardman at 1326-1327. No mention is made of those other factors here, in
spite of the fact that the Commission had
before it the evaluation of the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation that spells out
Norton's vocational history, educational
limitations, learning disability and age "in
concert with his multiple disabling conditions and a r^ed for total re-education."
That evaluation presents prima facie evidence that Norton, while not altogether
incapacitated for work, is so handicapped
that he will not be employed regularly in
any well-known branch of the labor market, Marshall at 212, and therefore falls
into the so-called "odd-lot" category.
Hardman at 1327.
[2-4] With respect to the administrative
law judge's finding that Norton's continued
work for six years was proof that he was
not permanently totally disabled in 1983, it
should be pointed out that that fact standing alone does not foreclose Norton's claim.
The administrative law judge correctly considered Norton's return to work as one
factor to be weighed in determining his
disability. He erred when he failed to con2. See the Commission's own explanation of the
difference between impairment and disability in
Northwest Carriers Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140, n. 3 (Utah 1981).
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sider the condition under which Norton
continued his employment, as manifested
by his finding "the very fact that the applicant continued to work in underground
mining for six years following his accident
is convincing evidence that his accident did
not render him permanently and totally
disabled/' Norton's decision to return to
work did not automatically disqualify him
from receiving permanent total disability
benefits, where the facts indicate that
throughout the remainder of his employ he
was not restored to health. The evidence
is undisputed that Norton spent the last six
of his working years in considerable pain.
Provided that a worker's disability was also
analyzed within the framework of the oddlot doctrine, case law dealing with the
factor of substantial pain has generally
held that "[a] worker who cannot return to
any gainful employment without suffering
substantial pain is entitled to compensation
benefits for total disability." Comeaux v.
Cameron Offshore Services, Inc., 420
So.2d 1209 (La.App.1982).
The presence of substantial pain may
logically cause an injured worker to fall
into this odd-lot category, inasmuch as it
directly affects the probable dependability with which the injured worker can sell
his services in a competitive labor market, undistorted by such factors as business booms, sympathy of a particular
employer or friends, temporary luck, or
the superhuman efforts of the claimant
to rise above his crippling handicaps.
Calogero v. City of New Orleans, 397
So.2d 1252, 1254 (La.1980), modified 434
So.2d 177 (La.App.1983) (benefits affirmed
on substantial pain theory alone), citing
L. A. Larson, The Law of Workman }s Compensation § 10-164.49 (1980). The probability of future impairment of future earning capacity as indicated by the nature of
the injury, the age of the worker, and other
relevant factors must likewise be assessed.
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Taylor, 468
S.W.2d 318 (Ky.1971). See also Harwell v.
Argonaut Insurance Co., 296 Or. 505, 678
P.2d 1202 (1984); Tsuchiyama v. Kahului
Trucking and Storage, Inc., 2 Hawaii App.
659, 638 P.2d 1381 (1982); Smith v. Indus-

trial Commission, 113 Ariz. 304, 552 P„2d
1198 (1976). Only where the employee returns to work under normal conditions will
the presumption of no loss of earning capacity stay unassailed.
Midland-Ross
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz.
311, 486 P.2d 793 (1971).
It may be years before the effect is felt.
But a man with a stiffened arm or damaged back or badly weakened eye will
presumably have a harder time doing his
work well and meeting the competition of
young and healthy men. When a man
stands before the worker's compensation
court with proven permanent physical injuries, for which the exclusive remedy
has abolished all possibility of common
law damages, it is not justifiable to tell
him he has undergone no impairment of
earning capacity, solely on the strength
of current paychecks.
Cleveland v. Cyprus Industrial Minerals,
196 Mont. 15, 636 P.2d 1386 (1981), citing
Fermo v. Superline Products, 175 Mont.
345, 574 P.2d 251 (1978). U need not be
restated at great length that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally
construed and that any doubt with respect
to the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured employee.
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984);
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567
P.2d 153 (Utah 1977).
Upon remand the Commission is required
to address Norton's disability in light of
all factors mentioned ante, and the burden
will be on the employer to prove the existence of regular, steady work that Norton
could perform, taking into account his age,
limited education, and functional illiteracy,
as well as his disabling pain. Contrary to
the Commission's disclaimer noted in
Northwest Carriers at 140, n. 3, permanent impairment alone is never the sole or
real criterion of permanent disability, and
a denial of permanent total disability based
on it alone invites reversal under well-settled stare decisis.
The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ADDENDUM 2

SBS!UL Mm

-

Hi^^^m( U t a h Ann

1QQ7\
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OMAN v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF UTAH

Utah

665

Cite as 735 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1987)

Charles G. OMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Peabody Coal Company, Old Republic
Insurance Company and Second Injury
Fund, Defendants.
No. 860189-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 15, 1987.

Worker sought modification of order
by Industrial Commission awarding him
permanent total disability benefits, and
payment of interest on benefits. The
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that:
(1) award of permanent total disability benefits to commence as of date permanent
total disability was first medically confirmed was not abuse of discretion in view
of progressive nature of worker's disability, and (2) worker was entitled to payment
of accrued interest on all unpaid benefits
commencing from date of medical confirmation.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

1. Workers' Compensation <s=>1939.11(9)
In reviewing date of commencement of
total permanent disability benefits, court
must determine if Industrial Commission's
order was supported by substantial evidence and was reasonable exercise of Commission's discretion.
2. Workers* Compensation <s=*868
Commencement of award for permanent total disability on date permanent total disability was first medically confirmed,
and not on date of industrial accident or on
date worker was last employed for employer, was not abuse of discretion in view of
progressive nature of worker's psychiatric
disability and difficulty of determining exact date of maturation of disability. U.C.
A.1953, 35-1-67.

3. Workers' Compensation <s=*1949
Possible gap between full development
of disability and payment of benefits will
not justify reversal.
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>1939.11(9)
It is within sound discretion of Industrial Commission to determine commencement date of benefits for total permanent
disability so long as determination is supported by substantial evidence and not patently unreasonable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67.
5. Workers' Compensation @»1041
Worker who was awarded permanent
total disability benefits as of date permanent total disability was first medically confirmed was entitled to payment of accrued
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing
from date of medical confirmation. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-78.
Henry K. Chai, II, Snow, Christensen &
Martmeau, Salt Lake City, for Peabody
Coal Co.
Erie V. Boorman, Adm'r Second Injury
Fund, Salt Lake City.
Virginius Dabney, Dabney & Dabney,
P.C., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and
BENCH, JJ.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff seeks modification of an order
by the Industrial Commission awarding
him permanent total disability benefits.
The benefits were to commence as of September 24, 1984, the date permanent total
disability was first medically confirmed.
Plaintiff urges benefits should commence
from either the day of the industrial accident (May 12, 1975) or the day after he last
worked for the employer (April 22, 1976),
whichever is later. Under that theory benefits would commence as of April 23, 1976.
Plaintiff also seeks payment of interest on
the benefits, which was denied by the Industrial Commission.
Plaintiff was injured in a mine cave-in on
May 12, 1975 in Huntington, Utah, while
working for Peabody Coal Company ('Tea-
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body"). He was treated orthopedically for
back problems and also received treatment
for depression. He returned to work on
June 15, 1975, but continued to receive
medical treatment. On June 29, 1976, a
three level fusion operation was performed
on plaintiff, and in December, 1977, further
surgery occurred, re-fusing plaintiffs
back. Plaintiff was awarded compensation
for a 25% permanent partial impairment of
the whole body for his back problems on
March 21, 1977.
On June 11, 1982 plaintiff applied for a
permanent total disability award because
of psychiatric impairment. Plaintiffs total disability was confirmed by a letter
dated September 9, 1984, from his physician. The doctor's confirmation was corroborated by other medical and mental
health professionals. The Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ), in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986), made a tentative finding of permanent total disability
and referred plaintiff to the Division of
Rehabilitative Services for evaluation,
training and certification. The Division
found that plaintiff could not be rehabilitated for employment. The A U entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an
order providing plaintiff with benefits from
July 21, 1985, the date of certification by
the Division of Rehabilitation. No interest
on unpaid benefits was awarded Plaintiff
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review challenging the
commencement date of benefits and failure
to order payment of interest. In response
the Industrial Commission denied payment
of interest but changed the benefit commencement date to September 24, 1984, the
first date of medicaJ confirmation,
[1] Plaintiff asks this Court to rule that
benefits should commence from April 23,
1976, the day after plaintiffs last day of
work for Peabody. Plaintiff cites Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-64 (1986) as mandating
commencement of workers' compensation
no later than three days after the injury.
However, that section deals with total temporary disability rather than total permanent disability as in this case. Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986) also uses "at the

time of injury" language to establish benefits, but only in conjunction with wages at
the time of injury. There is no statutory
language requiring benefits to commence
at either the date of injury or the last day
of employment, whichever occurs later.
Therefore, plaintiffs argument is without
merit. Thus, this Court must determine if
the Commission's order was supported by
substantial evidence and was a reasonable
exercise of the Commission's discretion.
Norton v. Indus. Commission, 728 P.2d
1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt Lake
City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323
(Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981).
[2,3] In this instance, while the accident causing the initial injury occurred in
1975, it was not until years later that the
injury developed to a point of total disability. The ALJ considered evidence that
plaintiff had operated a business and received income between 1976 (when he
stopped working for Peabody) and 1984.
The ALJ's findings state that "[a]U of the
evidence presented by the defendants was
convincing in showing the [plaintiff] is far
from being urtally invalid." Benefits were
awarded nonetheless, consistent with the
standard referred to in Norton, 728 P.2d
1025 (Utah 1986). In Norton, the Court
stated that a worker may receive benefits
who is not completely incapacitated but is
sufficiently handicapped so "that he will
not be employed regularly in any wellknown branch of the labor market." Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027. Plaintiff was not
totally and permanently disabled in 1976.
His psychiatric problems, which emanated
from the 1975 industrial accident, became
progressively worse, finally culminating in
total permanent disability. As found by
the ALJ, "[plaintiff] did not become permanently and totally disabled until after the
expiration of the initial six year period."
The Industrial Commission did not act unreasonably nor abuse its discretion by selecting the September 24, 1984, date for
commencement of benefits given the progressive nature of plaintiff's disability and
the difficulty of determining the exact date
of maturation of the disability. A possible
gap between full development of the dis-
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ability and payment of benefits will not
justify reversal. Booms v. Rapp, 720 P.2d
1636 (Utah 1986). We concur in the language of Spencer v. Indus. Commission,
87 Utah 336 40 P.2d 188 (1935):
. . . whether an employee is totally disabled or permanently disabled are ultimate matters to be decided by the commissioner, as is also the amount and time
compensation may be awarded upon all
the evidence. Id. at 197.
[4] It is within the sound discretion of
the Industrial Commission to determine the
commencement date of benefits for total
permanent disability so long as the determination is supported by substantial evidence and not patently unreasonable. Substantial evidence existed in this case for
commencing benefits as of the first date of
medical confirmation of permanent total
disability.
Plaintiff also appeals from the Industrial
Commission's denial of interest on unpaid
benefits. Plaintiff relies on Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) which states:
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of
8% per annum from the date when each
benefit payment would have otherwise
become due and payable.
[5] In Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) the Utah
Supreme Court held that this statute must
be retroactively applied to accrued or pending actions because its intent is remedial.
The case before us clearly falls within the
statutory language and pursuant to Marshall enactment of the statute subsequent
to the injury or disability is irrelevant.
Plaintiff is entitled to payment of accrued
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing
from September 24, 1984.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
No costs awarded.
GARFF and BENCH, JJ., concur.
(O

Cynthia DAHL, widow of Steven B.
Dahl, deceased, Plaintiff,
v.

The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH, Revlon Service, Inc.
and/or Liberty Mutual and/or Default
Indemnity Fund, Defendants.
No. 860215-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 15, 1987.

Wife of deceased worker appealed
from Industrial Commission's denial of her
motion for review of order dismissing claim
for dependent's death benefits The Court
of Appeals, Davidson, J., held that, notwithstanding facts that worker had filed
for divorce and parties did not live together, wife was dependent upon worker on
date of his death for purposes of determining her eligibility for death benefits.
Reversed and remanded.

Workers' Compensation <$=3446
Notwithstanding facts that deceased
worker had filed for divorce and parties did
not live together, deceased worker's wife
was dependent upon decedent on date of
his death for purposes of determining her
eligibility for dependent's death benefits,
where wife depended on worker to make
full mortgage payment on their family
home and to meet their joint debt payments. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-71(2), 35-1-73.

Michael E. Dyer, Stephanie A. Mallory,
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt
Lake City, for Liberty Mutual Insurance.
Susan Pixton, Adm'r, Default Indem.
Fund, Utah Indus. Com'n, Salt Lake City.
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Frank J. Gustm, Kent M. Kasting, Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, Salt Lake
City, for Cynthia Dahl.

ADDENDUM 3
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67

35-1-67

LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Vocational rehabilitation — Procedure
and payments.
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662/3% of
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years,
up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85%
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. However,
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance
carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings
have been had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the
state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of
the commission to order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of
the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed
$1;000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training of the employee shall generally follow the practice applicable under § 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state
board of education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing
that the employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall orcicjr that there be
paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of no 2/3% of his average
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85%
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with
the time that the payments, as in this section provided, to be made by the
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the
employee. No employee shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or
refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this
section.
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to benefits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those
injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than $120 per week when
paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with compensation
payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational
rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is
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qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the
employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee
has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms,
or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total
and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of
this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required
in those instances. In all other cases where there has been rehabilitation
effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be
based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for
312 weeks.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917,
§ 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1;
C. 1943,42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch.
52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1;
1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch.
71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1;
1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 5; 1971, ch.
76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. 13, § 1;
1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1977, ch. 150, § 1; 1977,
ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 6; 1979, ch. 138,
§ 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, ch. 356, § 1;
1985, ch. 160, § 1.
Compilers Notes. — The 1975 amendment
substituted "85% of the state average weekly
wage" for "662/3% of the state average weekly
wage" four times in the first paragraph and
once in the last paragraph; increased the minimum benefit per week from $35 to $45 in the
first paragraph, inserted "not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time
of the injury" twice in the first paragraph, increased the benefit per week from $50 to $60 at
the end of the third paragraph (deleted by the
1977 amendment) and near the end of the
fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amendment), and substituted "July 1, 1975" for "July
1, 1974" in the fourth paragraph (deleted by
the 1977 amendment)
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 substituted "spouse" for "wife" in the first paragraph
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by
chapter 151; combined the first two paragraphs
into one paragraph, inserted the second paragraph, and deleted the former third and fourth
paragraphs which read "Commencing July 1,
1971, all persons who are permanently and
totally disabled and on that date or prior
thereto were receiving compensation benefits
from the special fund provided for by section

35-1-68(1) shall be paid compensation benefits
at the rate of $60 per week
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who
were permanently and totally disabled on or
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation benefits and continue to receive such
benefits shall be paid compensation benefits
from the special fund provided for by section
35-1-68(1) at a rate sufficient to bring their
weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer or insurance carrier compensation payments "
The 1977 amendment by chapter 150, in the
two paragraphs deleted by the 1977 amendment by chapter 156 (quoted above) substituted "1977" for "1971" and "1975" and substituted "$75" for "$60.'
The 1979 amendment increased the minimum benefit m the second p a i ^ r a p h from $75
to $85
The 1981 amendment substituted "second injury fund" for "special fund" throughout the
section, and increased the amount in the second paragraph from $85 to $100
The 1983 amendment substituted "under
this section" at the end of the first paragraph
for "as set forth herein", increased the mini
mum amount in the first sentence of the seconc
paragraph from $100 to $110, and made minoi
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style
The 1985 amendment substituted "$120" fo
"$110" m the first sentence of the second para
graph
Effective Date. — Section 2 of Laws 198f
ch 160 provided "This act takes effect upo
approval by the governor, or the day followm
the constitutional time limit of Article VI
Sec 8 without the governor's signature, or i
the case of a veto, the date of veto override
Approved March 18, 1985
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